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INTRODUCTION : A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSING THE 
GROWTH OF SMALL INSULAR ECONOMIES  
 
The study of the growth of insular spaces – and in particular small insular economies – has 
been extended over the last fifteen years by researchers from France (De Miras, 1988 ; Crusol, 
1988 ; Célimène and Watson, 1991 ; Poirine, 1993 and 1995 ; Célimène and Salmon, 1995 ; 
Hein, 1996  ; Rochoux, 1997), Australia (Connell, 1988  ; Hayes, 1991  ; Hooper, 1992  ; 
Hooper and Kerry, 1993 ; Lodewijks, 1993) and New Zealand (Bertram, 1986 ; Bertram and 
Waters, 1986), with the aim of understanding the economic developments observed in the 
small islands of the Caribbean, the Pacific and the Indian Ocean.  
These authors have highlighted certain constraints – either natural or historical – which are 
specific to small insular economies:  
•  Distance : The distance between the small insular economies and world markets is 
considerable and affects both the nature of the economic exchanges and people’s 
mobility. Unlike other peripheral regions, one of the main effects of  insularity is that 
the physical distance is subordinate to the ‘access-distance’, which makes production 
heavily dependent on air and sea transport (Péraldi, 2002 ; Levratto, 2002). Transport 
costs become an important factor in the very choice of production specialisation. The 
enclosure of these economies, some of which are among the far peripheral regions of 
Europe, has therefore for a long time been considered as the major obstacle to starting-
up their industrial development (Mathieu, 1994 ; Martinez, 1996). 
•  Size: This aspect involves a small local market, limited stocks of natural or human 
resources, dependence on the exterior for supplies, in short the lack of a ‘critical mass’ 
of production resources which would allow sustainable development (Peron, 1993). 
Further, despite the reduced size of these economies, the fact that state-owned 
equipment and facilities have to be maintained at a certain level to satisfy the needs of 
the resident population, leads to a much-criticised “wasteful infrastructure”, which is 
nevertheless necessary to achieve European ‘standards’ of income per person, access 
to public services, and improvements in the standard of living and the level of 
consumption (Dommen and Leballe, 1988).  •  Colonial Dependence  : The history of most of these islands involves colonialism. 
Unlike metropolitan regions, whether in Europe or elsewhere, which were formed 
from the merging of national territories, the small insular economies were initially part 
of colonies; it was only during the second half of the 20
th Century that they were either 
integrated into the administrative set-up of the ‘motherland’, with varying degrees of 
success (the French overseas departments and territories, the ‘DOM-TOM’), or else 
chose  independence, also with varying success (Vanuatu, the Dutch and English West 
Indies, Mauritius and Samoa). According to historians and sociologists, the colonial 
past is the cause of some continuing conflicts, tension and blockages within these 
spaces, for example in the areas of labour organisation and land attribution (Ho, 1998). 
 
By taking into account these features, Jean Pierre (1997) held that the origin of the stagnation 
or backwardness of these regions is fundamentally linked to their history, and in particular to 
the initial conditions which characterise the beginnings of their development. This view 
involves an analysis of the reduction of regional inequality in a centre-periphery type model. 
It is therefore accepted that, for a certain number of small insular economies, supposed to be 
caught in a “poverty-trap” (Meade, 1968), the measures and choices relating to economic 
development depend as much on external factors – from mainland France, Europe or even 
internationally – as on local ones  (Rochoux, 1997 ; Jean Pierre, 1997). 
However, this approach does not incorporate the organisational changes which take place 
within the production activity of each economy. Two ideas stand out: 
•  The first concerns the ‘divergence’ of the possible growth pathways. As several 
empirical studies have shown (Crusol, Hein et Vellas, 1988 ; Fairbairn, 1988 ; Poirine, 
1995), far from adopting a single path converging towards a given stationary state, 
small insular economies follow quite different growth pathways. 
•  The second concerns the role played by regional development strategy, a thorny 
subject which well illustrates the ambiguity of the position of small economies relative 
to their current or previous ‘motherland’ and/or other dominant economic centres. 
Chosen according to local institutional decisions, the regional strategy is a tool for 
directing the development of the local participants and can become, in itself, a source 
of diverging economic performance.   
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To justify these two ideas one must accept the hypothesis that the sources of growth are not 
necessarily the same in each insular space. One can then follow Catin (1995) when he 
proposes a specification of the mechanisms of regional growth, by isolating three important, 
interconnected cumulative processes: multiplier effects, productivity effects and the effects of 
competitiveness. The first, inspired by Keynesian theory, describe how an exogenous push in 
the final demand linked to exports and/or public spending, has knock-on effects upstream or 
downstream and on wealth-creation. The second allow one to take into account supply 
dynamics which engender productivity gains connected with the implementation of 
investments in capacity, rationalisation and innovation. Finally, the third correspond to the 
effects of increased competitiveness on regional growth, through the setting up of a process of 
substitution for imports and/or through the promotion of exports. During a given stage of 
development, the combination of these three mechanisms leads to a ‘virtuous circle’ of 
growth which can follow differentiated industrial pathways (Catin, 1995). 
This analytical approach is illustrated by a comparative study of the long-term growth 
pathways of the two sister islands in the Indian Ocean, Reunion and Mauritius. Of similar 
size, only 120 km apart but 11,000 km from Paris and London, they feature striking 
similarities from the demographic, ethnological or sociological points of view, which could be 
described as the heritage of the Mascarene Islands. However, whereas Reunion has been fully 
integrated into the French Republic since 1946, Mauritius, after 150 years as a British colony, 
became an independent republic in 1971. 
After leading “parallel lives” for four centuries, thirty years of strong industrial growth 
produced a definitive divergence in the pathways of the two islands: Mauritius became the 
“tiger of the Indian Ocean” thanks to a policy of promoting exports based on improvements in 
competitiveness and productivity, while Reunion, as the ‘high achiever’ of the far-flung 
European regions, followed a growth route based on the effects of demand of the “insular rent 
income” for which the most tangible theoretical references are the New Zealand model 
MIRAB (Migrations, Remittances, Aid, Bureaucracy) and its variant ARABE (a French 
acronym for Aid, Administrative Allowance, State Bureaucracy), as applied in the studies on 
the French DOM-TOM (Bertram and Waters, 1986 ; Connell, 1988 ; Poirine, 1995 ; Rochoux, 
1997). 
In this paper we intend, initially, to go over the respective choices made by the two islands 
concerning industrialisation, and to study, using a set of macroeconomic indicators, their 
performance in terms of growth between 1982 and 1997. Secondly, we will attempt to describe their long-term economic pathways and investigate the development opportunities 
open to both of them today. 
 
1. THE HISTORY OF THE TWO SISTER ISLANDS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN 
1.1 A shared economic and historical heritage  
Reunion and Mauritius, which were only discovered and inhabited as late as the 16
th Century, 
followed parallel destinies for nearly 400 years. After temporary occupations by the 
Portuguese and the Dutch, the French “East India Company” took over the islands and 
instigated the first specialised tropical agriculture, as from the start of the 18
th Century. It was 
thus that coffee was developed in Reunion (then known as Bourbon Island) and sugar cane in 
Mauritius (then Ile de France). However, this situation was modified after 1765 as the system 
awarding privileges to the “Companies” was abandoned, because of competition from West 
Indian coffee and because of the high cost of transport. Further, whereas Mauritius, which 
was given privileges by its royal administrators, pursued a development based partly on sugar 
production and partly on its role as a trading stopover on the route to India, Reunion 
blossomed in its agricultural development and became the ‘granary of the Mascarenes’, with 
the aim of supplying its sister island in food products. This was the one – brief – period of 
complementary development of the two islands, giving a rare example of South-South 
exchange in the middle of the 18
th Century (Rochoux, 1986). 
The annexation of Mauritius by Great Britain following the Napoleonic wars and later the 
opening of the Suez canal put a stop to this integrated development dynamic and led once 
more to parallel pathways, this time characterised by the setting up of industrial mono-
cultivation of sugar in both islands. During the 20
th Century, companies in Mauritius and 
Reunion were built on this specialisation in production, which featured big landowners and 
colonists, large-scale immigration (“engagement”) of workers from India and China, and a 
strong dependence on exterior exchanges with their respective motherlands (Ho, 1998). 
After the second world war, the two islands were in very similar situations, and shared some 
traits with other ‘small economies’, be they insular or not
1. From an economic point of view, 
the key factor is the mono-specialisation in sugar cane : in Mauritius, the sugar production 
went from 348,000 metric tons in 1947 to 638,000 metric tons in 1967, whereas in Reunion, 
                                                 
1 Such as Sri Lanka, the Dominican Republic, the countries of Central America and the Caribbean.  
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which features more rugged terrain, it went from 38,000 metric tons in 1942 to 260,000 
metric tons in 1961. In the two scenarios, sugar represented over 95% of exports, going 
mainly to France and Great Britain. Although the landownership system allowed both small 
and large concerns to exist, it was the latter which dominated the sector. Thus, as regards 
transformation, despite the intense growth in production, there was a considerable reduction 
in the number of sugar refineries: from 250 at the start of the century, by the eighties only 17 
were left in Mauritius and 7 in Reunion. They belong to large Creole commercial groups, 
which constitute a ‘refinery oligarchy’ and local social set-up (Ramkissoon, 1994).  
From the 1960s, the two islands followed an industrial strategy of import-substitution. More 
diversified in Mauritius, where this involved the entire manufacturing sector, in Reunion it 
affected principally the food-processing and building industries (Rivière, 1999). The results of 
these rather ineffective strategies are controversial and have in any case had little impact on a 
development model marked by dependence on a specialised mono-cultivation which, linked 
to a very high birth-rate, led to the appearance of high unemployment – about 20% of the 
working population in Mauritius and 19% in Reunion – at the beginning of the 1970s. The 
lack of natural resources, the limited local or even regional demand, the weakness of public 
infrastructure, the distance from markets and investors, and a pronounced brain-drain, all 
added to the disadvantages of the Mascarene islands, which seemed to be caught in a vicious 
circle of under-development. 
The only notable difference between the two spaces is their institutional status. For Reunion, 
its Département status guarantees a certain level of road and transport infrastructure, water 
and electricity networks, as well as education and health services, thanks to the political will 
of the French government during the 1960s.  
1.2 Overview of the industrial development in the Mascarene Islands 
The roots of the different pathways of Reunion and Mauritius are in the choices they made 
concerning industrialisation, at the beginning of the 1970s. This can be deduced from 
studying a number of macro-economic data-sets
2.  
Between 1982 and 1997, the average annual increase in GDP by volume was 7% in Mauritius 
and 4.8% in Reunion. These figures are high compared to the mainland French regions (which 
averaged 2%) and other European regions. It is clear, as we can see in figure 1, that the 
                                                 
2 Relevant data can be found in the regional accounts of the INSEE in Reunion, and national accounts from the  
Central Statistics Office in Mauritius. difference between the two islands had been increasing : the average annual increase in GDP 
per person in Mauritius, between 1982 and 1997,  was 6% in Mauritius, but only 2.8% in 
Reunion, largely due to the greater increase in population in Reunion (1.9% compared to 1% 
in Mauritius)
3.  
Figure 1 : GDP change per person at fixed price(1982=100) 
 
Fundamentally different situations control the growth mechanisms in Reunion and in 
Mauritius (see table 1). 
Table 1 : Export/Import performance and economic openness in Reunion and Mauritius 
  Reunion Mauritius  France 
PARAMETER 1982  1997  1982  1997  1997   
Export Ratio 
   EXPORTS/GDP * 
0.06 0.04  0.47  0.63  0.25 
Import Ratio 
IMPORTS/GDP * 
0.44 0.39  0.50  0.68  0.23 
Openness Ratio     
   (EXPORTS+IMPORTS) / GDP 
0.51 0.43  0.97  1.31  0.48 
 Ratio   
    EXPORTS/IMPORTS 
0.15 0.11  0.94  0.93  1.13 
* One should note that for Reunion, as in all the overseas departments (Guadeloupe, Martinique and French 
Guyana), the exchange of goods and services with mainland France are included among the exports and imports.  
                                                 
3 From 1982 to 1997, the GDP per person at fixed prices (1982 level), went from 922 to 2169 dollars in 




























In Mauritius the degree of openness is more pronounced and exports play a driving role in the 
economic activity of the island. Whereas in Mauritius the volume of exchanges with the 
exterior is greater than the GDP (the openness ratio is 1.3), with a trade balance barely in 
deficit, in Reunion it is less than 0.5 with a very low exports/imports ratio (between 10 and 
15%). However, we must put this imbalance into context, as it represents a regional, and not a 
national, deficit. 
 
2. THE DIVERGENCE OF THE INDUSTRIAL PATHWAYS IN THE MASCARENES  
2.1. Growth in Mauritius  : the effects of competitiveness linked to the promotion of 
exports  
Industrialisation in Mauritius has been closely tied to an institutional framework particularly 
favourable to exporting. In 1970, Mauritius created a free zone, one of the first in the world 
(Yin et al, 1992). It gave the following advantages to the companies there: free movement of 
capital, tax-free importation of machines and raw materials, no tax payable during the first ten 
years, government-subsidized loans to aid exports, and privileged access to the 
communication and transport infrastructure. The first company to move to Mauritius, was an 
electronics company from Hong Kong, and employed 1000 people. Other foreign investors 
arrived subsequently, from France and the UK. At the same time, the signing of the Yaounde 
agreement in 1972, followed by those of Lome in 1975, opened the European market to the 
ACP countries, and therefore also to Mauritius. The American market remained partly open 
thanks to the “general system of preferences” which allowed these countries to sell their 
products, subject to certain conditions, without being subjected to quotas. Over 25 years, the 
European and American markets accounted for, respectively, 80% and 15% of Mauritian 
exports!  
The industrialisation of Mauritius was initially financed by direct foreign investment, 
particularly from Hong Kong, which accounted for 24% of fixed capital, 42% of the jobs and 
37% of the exports from the free zone. The links forged between the Chinese community in 
Mauritius and that of Hong Kong were the source of the flow of investment, which was also 
due to worries about the future of the Anglo-Chinese city, menaced as it was by Maoist 
China, and because it would be possible to penetrate the European market from a country 
which had signed the Lomé agreement, so avoiding the heavy import duties levied on Hong 
Kong’s competitors.     However, local capital quickly replaced the foreign investment, thanks to the sugar quota 
guaranteed to Mauritius by the Lomé agreement, which represented a significant export 
income. As from the beginning of the 80s, the ‘Planters’ joined forces with those from Hong 
Kong, through “joint ventures”, to take a share in the growth being enjoyed by the textile 
industry. Local capital represented 45% of the total invested in the free zone, whereas the 
equivalent share is only 17% in Taiwan and 1% in South Korea (Hein, 1996). This creation of 
home-grown investment should be seen as something positive for the industrial development 
of the country, even though it is still dependent of export income closely linked to 
international agreements. 
The second half of the 80s saw the Mauritian free zone take off, with annual growth above 
6% and total direct foreign investment of about 1,800 million rupees. Once the electronic 
industry had closed down in 1986, the free zone specialised in textiles to the exclusion of 
other industries (with 586 companies and 90,860 jobs), reaching its zenith in 1990 when it 
was the third largest hosiery exporter in the world. The performance of the free zone has made 
it the spearhead of the island’s industrial development. Figure 2 shows the strong correlation 
between industrial growth and export growth in Mauritius over twenty years, up to the middle 
of the 1990s. 
Figure 2 : Annual growth rate of industrial added value and of exports in Mauritius from 






































It should be noted that the textile sector’s good results, and also those of other industries in 
the island, were based almost entirely on the financial advantages available in Mauritius: low 
labour costs, access to European markets, and favourable taxation. The hourly wage in the 
hosiery industry has remained markedly lower than in other textile centres (Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Turkey, or Malaysia), thanks to the ‘dematerialisation’ of the free zone, that is the 
creation of workshops close to the workers’ living quarters. This has allowed the setting up of 
very flexible ‘rolling’ working arrangements among the women involved, without upsetting 
basic family structures (Paratian, 1994). Figure 3 shows that exports have varied inversely 
with real labour costs (based on the 1982 figure), with a one year delay corresponding to the 
time it takes to register changes in the performance of Mauritian companies. 
Figure 3 : Annual growth of exports and real average wages (based on 1982 figures) between 
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The economic growth therefore depended on competitive prices which were reinforced by a 
consistent policy of devaluing the Mauritian rupee with respect to the US dollar and European 
currencies. From 1982 to 1996, the rupee was devalued by 100% with respect to the US 
dollar, by 140% with respect to the French Franc and by 350% with respect to the South 
African Rand! Figure 4 show the effects of this monetary policy by comparing labour costs 
measured in rupees and in dollars.  
 Figure 4 : Comparison of the changes in labour costs in rupees and in $US   between 1982 
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As one can see, the competitive prices of Mauritian industry were based on extreme 
specialisation, which itself is based on the relatively low costs of factors of production and a 
favourable institutional framework. Thus, the multiplier effects of exports in the economy 
have remained weak, principally for two reasons (Catin, 1995) : 
•  The exporting companies, some of which are controlled by foreign funds, specialise in 
labour intensive sectors with a low degree of local integration (especially since the 
free zone’s regulations encourage the compartmentalization of activities), which does 
not allow the setting up of a real industrial field. The export performance of these 
companies has had little tendency to lead the way for other parts of the economy.  
•  The squeeze on wages, which was intended to maintain the international 
competitiveness of Mauritian companies, has prevented the spreading of extra revenue 
from the exporting sector, which could have generated an increase in domestic 
demand potentially satisfied by local supply.  
2.2 Growth in Reunion : multiplier effects linked to social benefits  
The growth in Reunion has been heavily dependent on the ‘administrative rent income’ 
represented by public financial transfers of funds (Miras, 1986 ; Poirine, 1993). However, in 
Reunion, instead of the traditional form of public spending carried out by government 
workers, there has been a swelling of individual households’ incomes, so increasing 
consumption. The increase in social payments paid to households has been consistently higher  
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than the increase in gross disposable income. At 11,200 million Francs in 1997, these 
payments represented 44% of income, compared with 4,400 million Francs and a 37% share 
of final consumption in 1982.  
This administrative income improved the growth of Reunion’s economy by a multiplier effect 
on demand, in the process reducing the disparities with mainland France (Squarzoni, 1986). 
As Rochoux (1997) has pointed out, this particular kind of income creates an ‘ousting effect’ 
on exporting activities and on competitiveness because it is households’ preferences which, 
directly or indirectly, influence the allocation of resources (figure 5). These preferences can 
however, be turned towards imported products, so reinforcing the dependence on mainland 
France.  
Figure 5 : Annual increase in final consumption and social benefits in Reunion between 1982 


























By aiming to satisfy the demand within its local market, Reunion has encouraged a mentality 
of enclosure within its local space and its relations with the mainland. In this respect, an 
arsenal of legal, fiscal and financial measures, which have been implemented in the far-flung 
European regions, have led to the creation of an extremely protectionist economic 
environment. Local companies benefit from a very favourable legal system, which taxes 
competing imports (the octroi de mer), from an advantageous tax system adapted to their 
needs, and from European grants for setting-up businesses, concerning employment (up to 
25% of the total salaries of a company) or equipment (up to 30% of total investment), as well as from a scheme of government loans supposed to facilitate the financing of industrial 
activity. 
The processes of industrialisation and productive diversification undertaken in Reunion are 
mainly in the final goods sector, in order to satisfy the growing local demand. In this set-up, 
the food-processing sector is very important (with 43% of total manufacturing industry) in a 
space in which service industries are dominant and already represent over 60% of total 
production. Some economists consider that the Reunion industrialisation process has been 
partly eclipsed by the direct change from a plantation economy to a service economy (these 
services are largely close-by ones for households, Lemps, 1987 ; Rochoux, 1990).  
 
3. THE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF THE DEVELOPMENT MODELS IN 
MAURITIUS AND REUNION. WHAT ARE THE PROSPECTS?  
At the dawn of the 21st Century the assessment of thirty years’ industrial growth in the two 
islands is mixed. While recognising the well-known successes of the two pathways taken, it 
must be stressed that the near future seems uncertain. The pathway chosen by Mauritius is 
slowly fading, while that of Reunion has led to socio-economic blockages. For sure, new 
development prospects exist, but these run counter to the expectations of those who cling to 
the political and economic positions taken twenty years ago; these people feel abandoned or 
threatened by the current development directions.   
3.1 Why is the Mauritius pathway fading ?  
During the second half of the 80s, which was the Mauritian ‘golden age’, the economic 
growth was characterised by an industrial build-up and corresponding increase in the number 
of jobs, particularly in the free zone : from 1984 to 1988, the number of companies rose by 
40% per year, and the number of jobs by 35%. During the 90s, this pace slowed down, but the 
economic growth continued thanks to the productivity gains that had already been made, once 
again mainly in the free zone. Mauritian industry has tried to continue its growth on this basis, 




































Mauritian industry has in this way moved progressively towards an intensive accumulation 
regime, as we can see in figure 7. 



































This attempt to improve productivity gains was in fact a response to two kinds of problems 
facing the Mauritian economy throughout the 1990s (Dimou and Schaffar, 2001) : 
•  on the one hand, doubts over the extension of the ‘multifibers’ agreement made 
investors from the Far East more reluctant to invest in Mauritius, as the island risked losing its access to European markets. These doubts were increased more recently by 
the signing of the Africa Bill in 1997, which lays down the conditions under which 
African countries can export to the US, and gives African countries an advantage over 
Mauritius, which does not satisfy the criteria relating to the origins of its raw-
materials.   
•  On the other hand, the opening up of China to outside investors, in particular those in 
Hong Kong, which has had a considerable effect on where Asian investors choose to 
invest. Further, the opening up of African economies close to Mauritius, particularly 
Madagascar, has “re-dealt the cards” in the Indian Ocean textile sector. As a result, in 
1989 the Mauritian group Floréal Knitwear was the first to relocate part of its 
production to Madagascar; during the next decade they were followed by other 
Mauritian companies hoping to benefit from the low labour costs in the larger island. 
In 1995, Madagascar opened a ‘dematerialised’ free export-zone, with about a hundred 
companies and 21,000 jobs in the clothing industry, which makes up 62% of 
companies and 74% of industrial jobs in the zone. Mauritian capital is responsible for 
80% of  direct foreign investment in textiles in Madagascar. 
These circumstances led inexorably to a drop in not only direct foreign investment (DFI) but 
also local investment. From 1991 to 1996, DFI represented only 1.9% of total investment in 
Mauritius compared to 5.1% in Sri Lanka, Mauritius’ traditional competitor in textiles. In 
1999, the ratio DFI/GDP was 0.9% in Mauritius compared to 10% in Singapore, 5.9% in the 
Philippines,  4.5% in Malaysia and 3.5% in the Dominican Republic, which well illustrates 
the waning appeal of Mauritius’ free zone (World Bank figures, 2000). From that time the 
Mauritian employment market has also shown signs of long-term recession. 
The Mauritian growth pathway is fading because its economy has so far failed to find a 
satisfactory way of progressively moving from exports based on low added value products to 
ones of high added value, despite a sustained increase in productivity gains. This is connected 
to the fact that apart from a few very large companies which have developed a degree of 
vertical integration in the field, most of the textile companies have remained firmly 
specialised in the cutting/sewing stages of “low quality” products aimed at the mass market 
(in particular, cotton jerseys). Working as subcontractors for foreign orders, these companies 
import 73% of their raw materials from Asia and export 80% of their finished products to 
Europe. However, the obligation to export practically all their production, in order to benefit 
from the favourable free zone set-up, means there is almost no local  exchange. In this respect  
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the Mauritian textile sector can be considered ‘poor’ with regard to its inter-sector relations 
(exchanges or cooperation) between its producers (Dimou and Schaffar, 2001). 
The reluctance of companies to take on a technological strategy, the lack of an established 
training dynamic within the industrial workforce and a certain industrial inertia have, so far, 
kept the Mauritian economy relatively uncompetitive. In the circumstances, Mauritius has two 
possibilities, which could be combined:  
•  The first would continue the specialisation in textiles while promoting the introduction 
of technological advantages – with corresponding financial advantages – for the 
companies in the sector, in order to protect them from outside competition. The 
creation of a textiles design institute (the Clothing Technology Centre) in 1999, the 
setting up of a system to allow producers to share information (Electronic Data 
Exchange) and the quest for global quality control (Total Quality Management) 
according to the norms ISO 9000 all display the will to work together to share the 
technological costs among these textile companies, so that they can satisfy the new 
expectations in Europe and the US : limited editions, fast delivery, large product 
choice and good quality. This option will lead to stronger integration of the textile 
field into the national economy. It unites the quest for the benefits of higher 
productivity with those of non-price related competitiveness.  
•  The second would promote other sectors of activity. During the 1980s Mauritius 
developed its ‘off-shore’ and free port activities; the former, encouraged by the 
authorities, experienced a boom during the second half of the decade (5000 foreign 
companies were registered!), and put Mauritius on the regional development map. It 
achieved the status of a regional financial hub for the Indian Ocean between Bombay 
and Cape-Town.   
However, some choices will have to be made : the rapid accumulation of capital by the off-
shore sector has been at the expense of the textile sector, and these two sectors have 
conflicting monetary policy needs, as the older sector prefers a weak rupee, the exact opposite 
preference to the off-shore sector. Whichever strategy is chosen, it will aim for growth 
without significant direct job creation, because the ultra-capitalistic off-shore sector has only 
resulted in 500 direct jobs over five years, while the more technological direction of the 
textiles industry is intended to improve productivity, rather than the amount of activity. 
Finally, we should note here that Mauritius is developing a large tourism sector, aimed principally at the luxury end of the market. This sector, dominated by foreign investment 
(French, British and above all South African), has created a certain number of low-qualified 
jobs.     
3.2 Why has the Reunion pathway become blocked ? 
The Reunion paradox is that the relatively high growth in GDP has been accompanied by a 
steady increase in unemployment. Numerous studies have shown that demographic changes 
and changing social behaviour are largely responsible for this development, characterised by  
simultaneous increases in the size of the working population, the level of activity, number of 
jobs and the unemployment rate (Rochoux, 1996). However, the same demographic and 
social trends are present in Mauritius, and yet there they have had the opposite effect (figure 
8). 
 


































At the beginning of the industrialisation process, Reunion had 25,700 job-seekers, 
representing 19.2% of the working population. Thirty years later, the unemployment rate had 
gone past 100,000, or 41.6%, which is much higher than in Mauritius, and also much higher 
than the rates in the other French overseas departments. This huge unemployment has hit in 
particular young job-seekers (53% of the unemployed) and the poorly educated (85% of 
Reunion’s job-seekers have at best achieved a UK GCSE level). This situation is the result of 
a deteriorating  ratio of job offers to job-seekers: from 22.5% in 1982, it had dropped to 6% in  
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1997! To explain the failure of GDP growth to lead to a reduction in unemployment, one must 
study Reunion’s development pathway.   
The roots of the problem can be found in the very structure of the Supply in the region. In 
Reunion, the high final demand has been satisfied by a joint increase in local production and 
in imports from mainland France, with the local market divided between two type of 
operators: industrial concerns involved in import-substitution and trading companies involved 
in import-distribution. The former specialise in basic consumer products and to a certain 
extent in intermediary goods, while the latter take care of equipment/facilities. Given this 
situation,  two connected kinds of blockages have developed : 
•  Firstly, the lack of any state-of-the-art industrial specialisation, the growth of which 
could pull up the rest the economic activity with it. Unlike in Mauritius, the productive 
equipment in Reunion, which is largely in the service sector (in 1999 services 
represented 72% of GDP), is highly dispersed with a predominance of very small 
companies (in 1999, taking all sectors together, 90% of companies had less than five 
employees). The absence of integrated productive fields and as a result the lack of 
intermediate demand from local companies means that the final demand is all that is 
driving growth in Reunion.      
•  Secondly, the development of an oligopoly within the existing companies, which 
specialise in import-distribution, has provided a fierce impediment to the introduction 
of new competitors into the market-place (either through legal measures specific to the 
overseas Departments, or else through ‘predatory tactics’ which involve fixing sale 
prices below the entry threshold into the market). We note in this context that if 
companies in Reunion are rated by turnover alone, then among the top twenty there 
are thirteen trading companies specialised in large-scale retailing and three banks.    
However, as Ho (2001) has pointed out, the knock-on effects of retailing are felt well beyond 
the business world: by attracting the final demand, these companies dominate local 
production and have an influence on the structuring of the territory. This domination has 
allowed them to appropriate the administrative rent income, via final consumption. However, 
far from investing in productive activities which would have a positive effect on economic 
activity and create jobs, these companies’ strategies are merely either to maximise their 
profits and operating surpluses, or else to invest outside Reunion (in Vietnam, Mauritius or 
South Africa).  This trend explains the slow deterioration in multiplier effects. Using Catin’s formula (1995) 
to calculate the multiplier k for public spending or exports, where: 
) ) ( 1 ( 1
1
m t c i c
k
+ ∗ + − − −
=   
4 
we find that k=2.55 for 1982, and k=1.61 for 1997, showing the slow deterioration of 
multiplier effects in Reunion, following on from the development of import-distribution. 
Today, by tightening their grip in both  the service and tourism sectors, these companies 
would seem to be an obstacle and a major source of conflict for any future local development 
in Reunion. The island is currently suffering from ‘Dutch disease’, which is a characteristic of 
economies which feature an rent income effect (Van Wijnbergen, 1984; Campan and 
Grimaud, 1989 ; Arzelier, 1999), the ousting of activities which produce exportable goods or 
services, price increases in a sector protected from international competition and the over-




Reunion and Mauritius, throughout their history, have featured a series of demographic, social 
and economic similarities. However, over thirty years of industrial expansion the two sister 
islands took different development pathways, one opening up to the international economy, 
the other somewhat withdrawn as a peripheral zone of France and of Europe. Despite strong 
growth during the 80s and 90s, these spaces have become more fragile at the start of the 21
st 
Century. The exhaustion of the supply dynamic in Mauritius and the blocking of the demand 
dynamic in Reunion mean that new regional development policies are now needed. 
                                                 
4 Where c is the marginal propensity to consume,  i is the marginal propensity to invest, t is the marginal 
variation in taxation and m is the marginal propensity to import).   
  20
REFERENCES 
ARZELIER M-P., 1999, Exportation de ressources naturelles et évolution industrielle : une 
modélisation dynamique par la théorie du contrôle optimal, Région et Développement, n°9, 
pp.75-98. 
BERTRAM G., 1986, Sustainable development in Pacific micro-economies, World 
Development, vol.14, n°7, pp.809-822. 
BERTRAM G., WATERS R.F., 1985, The MIRAB economy in South Pacific Microstates, 
Pacific Viewpoint, vol.26, n°3.  
CAMPAN E., GRIMAUD A., 1989, Le syndrome hollandais, Revue d’Economie Politique, 
n°6. 
CATIN M., 1993, Performances à l’exportation, structures de production et niveaux de 
développement des régions, Revue d’Economie Régionale et Urbaine, n°4, pp.633-647. 
CATIN M., 1995, Les mécanismes et les étapes de la croissance régionale, Région et 
Développement, n°1, pp.11-28. 
CELIMENE F., SALMON J-M., 1995, Croissance à long terme et chômage structurel dans 
les petites économies insulaires Région et Développement, n°2, pp.110-135. 
.CELIMENE F., WATSON B., 1991, Economie politique caraïbienne, Economica, Paris. 
CENTRAL STATISTICAL OFFICE OF MAURITIUS, 2001, Study on productivity, 
Ministry of Trade, Maurice.  
CONNELL J., 1988, Sovereignty and Survival, Island Microstates in the Third World, 
Research Monography n°3, University of Sydney. 
CRUSOL J., 1988, Problèmes spécifiques du développement des économies insulaires de la 
Caraïbe, in Crusol J., Hein P., Vellas F, op.cit. 
CRUSOL J., HEIN P., VELLAS F., 1988, L’enjeu des petites économies insulaires, 
Economica, Paris. 
DE MIRAS C., 1986, L’économie martiniquaise : développement sans croissance, Actes du 
colloque Iles tropicales : insularité, insularisme, CRET, Bordeaux, 23-25 octobre 1986. 
DE MIRAS C., 1988, L’économie martiniquaise : croissance et excroissance ?, Revue Tiers 
Monde, tome XXIX, n°114. DIMOU M., SCHAFFAR A., 2001, L’épuisement d’une trajectoire industrielle. Le cas de 
l’île Maurice, Troisième Colloque de Proximité, Nouvelles croissances et territoires, 
Université de Paris X et INRA, Paris, 13-14 décembre 2001.  
DOMMEN E., LEBALE N., 1988, Caractéristiques des exportations des pays insulaires, in 
Crusol J., Hein P., Vellas F, op.cit. 
FOWDAR, N., 1999, Industrialization in Mauritius, Conférence à Montréal, Université de 
Montréal, Novembre. 
HAYES G. 1991, Migration, Metascience and development policy in Island Polynesia, The 
Contemporary Pacific, volume 3, n°1, pp.1-58. 
HEIN, P., 1996, L’économie de l’île Maurice, L’Harmattan, Paris. 
HO Q., 1998, Contribution à l’histoire économique de l’île de la Réunion, L’Harmattan, Paris. 
HO Q., 2001, 38 chefs d’entreprises de la Réunion témoignent, Azalées éditions, La Réunion. 
HOOPER A., 1992, Socio-cultural aspects of development in the South Pacific, 
communication au colloque The future of Asian Pacific Economies, 10-12 novembre, 
Brisbane, Australie. 
HOOPER A., KERRY J., 1993, Sustainability and Pacific cultures, communication à la 4eme 
conférence des Pacific Islands Leaders, 24-26 juin, Tahiti. 
INSEE, 2002, Tableau économique de la Réunion, Insee de la Réunion, Saint Denis. 
JEAN PIERRE P., 1997, Dynamique d’une économie régionale en développement au sein de 
la Communauté Européenne, Région et Développement, n°5, p.93-129. 
LEMPS H.C., 1987, De la primauté des plantations à l’économie des services. Le cas de 
Hawaii, Actes du colloque Iles tropicales : insularité, insularisme, CRET, Bordeaux, 23-25 
octobre 1986. 
LEVRATTO, N, 2002, Les problèmes et les politiques de développement en Corse, Région et 
Développement, n°15, pp.167-193. 
LODEWIJKS J., 1993, The curious case of economic anthropology, communication à la 
Conference of economists, University of Perth, 25-31 septembre, Australie. 
MARTINEZ P., 1996, Aperçu sur l’évolution démographique à la Réunion depuis 1945, 
Institut Austral de Démographie, Séminaire du 3 décembre 1996, Saint Denis.  
  22
MATHIEU J.L., 1994, L’outre-mer français, PUF, Paris. 
MEADE J.E. et al, 1968, The economic and social structure of Mauritius, Frank Kass, 
London. 
PARATIAN, R., 1994, La république de l’île Maurice dans le sillage de la délocalisation, 
L’Harmattan, Paris. 
PERALDI X., 2002, Accessibilité des régions périphériques de l’Union européenne et 
politiques publiques de transport, Région et Développement, n°15, pp.121-144. 
PERON F., 1993, Des îles et des hommes, Editions de la Cité, Paris. 
POIRINE B., 1993, Le développement par la rente dans les petites économies insulaires, 
Revue Economique, vol.44, n°6, p.1169-1199. 
POIRINE B., 1995, Les petites économies insulaires. Théorie et stratégies de développement, 
L’Harmattan, Paris. 
RAMKISSOON, J., 1994, Sugar cane and other agiculture, in Lutz, W., 1994, Population, 
development, environment  : understanding their interactions in Mauritius, Spinger Verlag, 
Berlin. 
RIVIERE F., 1999, Les facteurs de compétitivité industrielle à l’île de la Réunion et l’île 
Maurice : une étude comparée, Région et Développement, n°10, p ; 5-37. 
ROCHOUX J-Y., 1986, Du sucre aux services ou du développement économique de la 
Réunion, Actes du colloque Iles tropicales : insularité, insularisme, CRET, Bordeaux, 23-25 
octobre 1986. 
ROCHOUX J-Y., 1990, La simulation des comptes économiques réunionnais, Revue 
d’Economie Régionale et Urbaine, n°3, p.445-459. 
ROCHOUX J-Y., 1996, De la population au chômage  : de la nécessité de calculer des 
nouveaux taux, Institut Austral de Démographie, Séminaire du 3 décembre 1996, Saint Denis. 
ROCHOUX J-Y., 1997, Transferts financiers publics et développement régional. Le cas d’une 
région d’outre mer : La Réunion, Région et Développement, n°5, p.5-39. 
SQUARZONI R., 1986, Quarante ans de départementalisation, L’économie de la Réunion, 
INSEE, n°23, p.4. 
VAN WIJBERGEN S., 1984, The dutch disease  : a disease after all   n0373.. pp.41-55. 
Economic Journal, Vol.94 WORLD BANK, 2000, Report on world development, Washington 
YIN P. et al, 1992, L’île Maurice et sa Zone franche, T-Printers, Port Louis. 
 
Abstract : 
The economic development of small islands may follow different pathways, according to the 
particular combination of growth mechanisms. A comparative study of the long term growth 
in Mauritius and in Reunion Island, two islands with strong historical, sociological and cultural 
parallels, shows that they are engaged in two different processes of industrialization. 
Reunion has focused on its local market and a demand-oriented development related to the 
“administration income”. Mauritius, on the other hand, has preferred a supply-oriented model, 
strongly exposed to international competition. Nevertheless, both economies faced structural 
problems in the late nineties, when the industrialization dynamics faded away in Mauritius 
and almost stopped in Reunion.  
Résumé : 
Dans les petites économies insulaires, la conjugaison des mécanismes de croissance peut 
conduire à des trajectoires de développement différenciées. L’étude comparée des 
trajectoires de la Réunion et de Maurice montre que ces deux économies, très proches sur le 
plan géographique, historique et sociologique, se sont engagées dans deux processus 
d’industrialisation différents. La première s’est renfermée sur son marché local en visant les 
effets de demande générés par la « rente administrative », tandis que la seconde a opté 
pour une très forte ouverture économique en s’appuyant sur des effets de compétitivité et 
des effets de productivité. La deuxième moitié des années quatre-vingt-dix montre 
cependant l’apparition d’une certain nombre de problèmes avec l’épuisement des 
dynamiques d’offre engagées à Maurice et le blocage des dynamiques de demande à la 
Réunion.  
Key words : Insular economies, La Reunion, Maurice, growth mechanisms, industrialization. 
Mots clés  : Economie insulaire, La Réunion, Maurice, mécanismes de croissance, 
industrialisation. 
Classification JEL : F14, L67, O14, P51 